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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a seigniorage model including the contributions 
of Bailey (1956) and Marty (1976), using a different framework to Mankiw (1987), to 
test whether their results are supported, and use a numerical example to estimate the 
seigniorage model. The government decides the money growth rate to maximize the 
social welfare function for each of seigniorage revenue aversion, loving and neutrality. 
The numerical example using Japanese data shows that the social welfare function 
supports seigniorage revenue aversion, supporting the results of Bailey and Marty, and 
that the degree of seigniorage revenue aversion is stronger in the 2000s than in the 
1990s. 
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1. Introduction 
 Money growth theory has two strands. First, the optimal money growth rate aims to 
control inflation, GDP, the exchange rate and so on. Second, the optimal growth rate 
aims to maximize seigniorage revenue. We consider the second strand in this paper. To 
date, the so-called seigniorage model in which the government decides the money 
growth rate to maximize seigniorage revenue was developed by Bailey (1956) and 
extended by Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 188–194). Honohan (1996), Loviscek 
(1996), Turner and Benavides (2001) and Tekin-Koru and Özmen (2003) have applied 
this model to empirical studies. However, prior to Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Bailey 
(1956) and Marty (1976) proposed a seigniorage model where the government 
maximizes the seigniorage revenue together with consumer revenue. This is because 
seigniorage revenue reduces consumer revenue and induces a welfare loss. Then, based 
on the Bailey and Marty models, Mankiw (1987) proposed a seigniorage model where 
the government chooses the rates of tax and money growth to minimize the social cost 
of raising revenue from tax and seigniorage. Amano (1998) and Ho (2003) provided 
support for Mankiw’s model. 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a seigniorage model including the 
contributions of Bailey and Marty, using a different framework from Mankiw (1987), to 
test whether their results are supported, and use a numerical example to estimate the 
seigniorage model. The government decides the money growth rate to maximize the 
social welfare function involving seigniorage revenue aversion, loving and neutrality. 
The numerical example using Japanese data supports the existence of a social welfare 
function consistent with seigniorage revenue aversion, supporting the results of Bailey 
and Marty, and shows that the degree of seigniorage revenue aversion is stronger in the 
2000s than in the 1990s. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose a 
seigniorage model. In Section 3, we propose a statistical methodology of estimating and 
testing this model. In Section 4, we present a numerical example to evaluate whether the 
social welfare function supports seigniorage revenue aversion (Bailey and Marty’s 
result) and the magnitude of the degree of aversion. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. The Model 
2.1. Market equilibrium 
 We briefly present the seigniorage model of Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 
188–194), which is composed of two equations dealing with the relationship between 
money and price, and transform their model to a discrete type from a continuous one for 
the sake of empirical analysis: 
0,0,0,)exp( ≥>>−=≡ tt
t
t
t RaAyaRAP
M
m , (1) 
1 ( ), 0, 1
e e e
t t t tb b abπ π π π+ − = − > ≠ , (2) 
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where 1
e
t tR r π += +  (r is the real interest rate and πt+1e ≡ (Pet+1 – Pt)/Pt is the expected 
inflation rate formed at period t) is the nominal interest rate, y  is real output, Mt is the 
money supply, Pt is the price level and A, a, b are positive constant terms. Furthermore, 
πt ≡ (Pt – Pt–1)/Pt–1 is the actual inflation rate observed at period t. The real variables 
yr ,  are assumed to be constant over all periods. Equation (2) shows the expected 
inflation πt+1e (price Pet+1) formed at period t, given the actual inflation πt at period t and 
expected inflation πet at period t–1. Equation (1) shows that the actual inflation πt (price 
Pt) clears the money market. The government controls only the constant money growth 
rate θ over time, 1 1( ) /t t tM M Mθ − −≡ − .1 
 How is the inflation rate πt decided by the growth rate θ  ? Take logarithms of 
(1) and rearrange, considering period t and t–1 in equation (1) to obtain: 
)( 1
e
t
e
tt a πππθ −−=− + . (3) 
Moreover, we insert equation (2) into (3): 
)( ettt ab πππθ −−=− . (4) 
Thus, we can get the actual inflation rate πt (i.e., Pt) at period t, given the expected 
inflation rate πte at period t–1 and the money growth θ (i.e., Mt). However, given πt–1 
and πt–1e, the expectation πte is formed by (2). What are the dynamics of the expectation 
πte? Furthermore, what are the dynamics of the actual inflation rate πt? The detailed 
derivation and the stability condition are given in Appendix 1. Here, we focus on the 
steady state. The steady state of πte = πt+1e lead to πte = πt because of (2), which leads to 
πt = θ because of (4) and then πte = θ. The following is true at this steady state: πt+1e = θ 
and then 1
e
t tR r rπ θ+= + = + . 
 
 
2.2. On seigniorage revenue and consumer revenue 
 The seigniorage at t, i.e., the revenue raised from the creation of money, is 
defined as: 
t
t
t
t
tt
t
tt
t mP
M
M
MM
P
MM
S θ=•−=−≡ ++ 11 . (5) 
The seigniorage revenue S at the steady state (where θ = πte = πt, and money demand (1) 
equals supply) is, considering (1): 
exp( ( )) ( )S Ay a r gθ θ θ= − + ≡ , (6) 
))(exp()1(/ raayAddS +−−= θθθ . 
                                                 
1 The validity of these assumptions was explained by the model of Sidrauski (1967) and further 
developed by Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 188–198). 
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Here, the subscript t denoting the period is deleted as we consider the steady state 
hereafter. The seigniorage revenue S is illustrated as the shaded part in Figure 1. In the 
seigniorage model of Blanchard and Fischer (1989), the maximized seigniorage revenue 
S* of (6) at the steady state is obtained at: 
 θ* = 1/a.: S* = S(θ*). (7) 
 We assume that a consumer decides money demand m to maximize the 
consumer profit V, given R: 
 ( )V U m mR≡ − , (8) 
where U (m) is a consumer’s utility measured in money m, the so-called consumer 
revenue, and mR is the cost of interest payments, the so-called consumer cost. The 
consumer’s maximum profit V is obtained at md where U′(md) = R. Its maximum value 
is: 
0
( )
dm dU x dx m R′ −∫ . (9) 
On the other hand, the bank profit is assumed to be the interest payment Rmd. Then, the 
private sector profit is the total profit of the consumer and the bank, which is always 
equal to the consumer revenue as long as the consumer behaves so that: 
0 0
( ) ( )
d dm md dU x dx m R m R U x dx′ ′− + =∫ ∫ . (10) 
Using the necessary condition for the maximum, U′(md) = R, we can rewrite (10) as 
0 0
( ) ( )
d dm m
U x dx R x dx′ =∫ ∫ . Moreover, the consumer revenue U(md) is expressed as 
U(m), considering that md equals the money supply mS, which is exogenously controlled 
by the government, through the adjustment of R because of the money market 
equilibrium condition (1): md = mS = m. Thus, given the exogenously determined money 
supply (mS = m) controlled by the government, the maximized private sector profit 
(which equals consumer revenue) is as follows: 
0
ln( ) 1 (ln( ) 1 ln( ))( ) ln( )
( ( ) 1)exp( ( )) ( ),
/ ( ( ))exp( ( ))
m Ay m Ay mU m x dx
a a a
Ay a r a r f
a
dU d Ay a r a r
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
+ −⎡ ⎤≡ − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
+ + − += ≡
= − + − +
∫
, (11) 
where )ln(1)ln(1 m
a
yA
a
R −=  is resolved in terms of R after taking the logarithm of (1). 
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 Next, we consider how the government maximizes the private sector profit by adjusting 
the exogenously given money supply m. By using (11), the maximization of total 
private profit is obtained at: 
θ ∗∗  = – r , that is, 0R rθ∗∗ ∗∗= + = : ( )U U θ∗∗ ∗∗= . (12) 
[INSERT Figure 1] 
 
 
2.3. Government behavior 
 The government chooses the money growth rate θ to maximize the following 
social welfare function W, which is expressed in terms of the exogenously given money 
supply m (θ ) controlled by the government: 
1( ) :
( ), ( ), 0, 0, 0 1, 0
Max W S S U
S g U f S S U S
α α
θ
θ θ α
−= +
= = + > > ≤ ≤ > , (13) 
where the social welfare function consists of seigniorage S and consumer revenues 
(private sector profit) U, considering the viewpoint of Bailey (1956) and Marty (1976). 
The seigniorage revenue S may be negative if the growth rate θ is negative, as is 
obvious in (6). The minimum of S is − S  at , . ., 0r i e R rθ θ= − = + = . Then, 
( 1)( ) exp( ( ))S r Ay a r r rAy= − − − − + = . This social welfare function W has the 
following features, as shown in Figure 2. In particular, when the function displays 
seigniorage revenue loving, that is α = 1, it is flat against the U axis and social welfare 
increases only through an increase in seigniorage revenue. However, when the function 
displays seigniorage revenue neutrality, that is α = 0, it is flat against the S axis and 
social welfare increases only through increases in consumer revenue. Finally, when the 
function displays seigniorage revenue aversion, that is 0 < α < 1, it is convex against the 
origin. The decrease in α produces an increase in seigniorage revenue aversion. 
[INSERT Figure 2] 
 We rewrite the maximizing problem (13) as follows, by deleting the money 
growth rate θ: 
1 1
,
( ) ( ( ))
S U
Max W S S U subject to S g f Uα α− −= + = . (14) 
S = g(f–1(U)) shows a locus of realizable values of S and U for any θ. We choose S and 
U through θ. However, in (14), we seem to be choosing S and U directly. The shape of 
its locus is as follows. The maximized S is obtained at U = U(θ*) where θ* = 1/a as 
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seen in (7), while the maximized U is obtained at ( )S S Sθ ∗∗= =  where r−=**θ  as 
seen in (12), as shown in Figure 3. When θ increases towards θ* = 1/a beyond θ** = –
r , U decreases from ( )U U θ∗∗ ∗∗=  because of (12) and S increases towards S(θ*) 
because of (7). When θ increases beyond θ* = 1/a, U decreases because of (12) and S 
decreases from S(θ*) because of (7), as shown in Figure 3. Then, U is not a one-to-one 
correspondence in S, but U in the region of [θ**, θ*] is a one-to-one correspondence in 
S. Thus, S = g(f–1(U)) can be shown in Figure 3. 
 The derivatives of S = g(f–1(U)) in terms of U are, by using (6) and (11): 
)(
1
))(exp())((
))(exp()1(1
ra
a
rarayA
raayA
d
dUd
dS
dU
Sd
+−
−=+−+−
+−−=•= θ
θ
θθ
θθ
θ
θ , (15) 
θ
θ
θ
θ a
ra
d
dSd
dU
dS
Ud
−
+−=•=
1
)(1 , (16) 
where R r θ= +  > 0 and then rθ > − : the derivative is undefined for rθ = − . What is 
the shape of S = g(f–1(U)) in terms of U? Is it strictly concave? 
0
))(exp())((
1
)(
1)(/)( 22
2
<+−+−+
+==
rarayAra
ara
d
dUd
dU
Sdd
dU
dU
Sdd θθθ
θ
θ  (17) 
Then, S = g(f–1(U)) is strictly concave in U. 
 Among realizable couples of (S, U) on S = g(f–1(U)) for a given θ, we must 
choose the particular couple of (S, U) to maximize the social welfare function, 
1( )W S S Uα α−= + . When this function displays seigniorage revenue loving (α = 1), the 
maximized social welfare W is uniquely obtained at point A (S(θ*), U(θ*)) because of 
the strict concavity of S = g(f–1(U)) and the convexity of social welfare function W , 
where θ* = 1/a, as shown in Figure 3. However, when the function displays seigniorage 
revenue neutrality (α = 0), the maximized social welfare W is obtained at point B 
(S( **θ ), U( **θ )) uniquely, where ** **: . ., 0r i e R rθ θ= − = + = . When the function 
displays seigniorage revenue aversion (0 < α < 1), the maximized social welfare W is 
obtained uniquely at some point C (S( ***θ ), U( ***θ )) between A and B. 
 
Proposition 1: The optimal ***θ  is expressed as follows when 0 < α < 1. 
2 *** ***( )
1
a r
ar
θ θα += +  (18) 
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The proof is given in Appendix 2. Equation (18) can be interpreted as a solution for the 
optimal money growth ***θ , given the other parameters. Alternatively, the unknown 
preference parameter α is expressed by the observed (optimal) money growth θ, 
observed real interest rate r  and the estimated money demand parameter a. We have 
already shown that the decrease in α (which means that the indifference curve of a 
social welfare function in Figure 2 approaches the vertical line) is an increase in 
seigniorage revenue aversion. 
 The actual seigniorage revenue and consumer revenue data, dependent on the 
money growth rate θ, are observed in Figure 4. We investigate whether these data are 
observed around point A, point B or point C. That is, whether the government has a 
social welfare function W displaying seigniorage revenue loving, neutrality or aversion, 
or, how is the seigniorage model? 
[INSERT Figure 3 and Figure 4] 
 
 
3. Statistical Methodology 
 We show a testing and estimation method to evaluate whether the social welfare 
function displays seigniorage revenue aversion, as suggested by Bailey and Marty, and 
estimate the degree of aversion. To do this, we proceed as follows. First, we estimate 
the money demand function (1). By using the estimated parameter a, we calculate 
θ* = 1/a, seigniorage revenue and consumer revenue, i.e., point A (S(θ*), U(θ*)). 
However, we calculate point B (S(θ**), U(θ**)) where r−=**θ , by using 
0** =+= rR θ . Second, we test whether the observed data have originated from point 
A, B or C. However, because the observed data consists of the growth rate of money θ 
and nominal interest rate R, we test whether the observed money growth rate θ was 
obtained from θ* = 1/a and whether the observed nominal interest rate R was obtained 
from R = 0. If the data originated from C, this supports the results of Bailey and Marty 
that the government considers both revenues. Moreover, by estimating the preference 
parameter α in (18) based on the observed data, we measure and compare the degree of 
aversion on seigniorage revenue in two different periods. 
 We estimate the parameter a for money demand function (1) in the logarithm 
form: 
)ln(,)ln( yACaRCm tt ≡−= . (19) 
This money demand function is a function at the steady state for not only real, but also 
monetary variables. We then consider the function to be a cointegration term in a two-
dimensional VAR model with a nominal interest rate R and a real money supply m. We 
have to estimate a in (19) as a cointegrating term in the following equation (21). The 
following statistical methodology is used. Let Xt = )'),ln(( tt Rm  and assume that this 
vector is generated from a vector autoregression VAR(k) model with a constant term ψ 
and Gaussian errors εt: 
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1 1 1 2 ...t t t k t k tX X X X ψ ε− − −=Π +Π + +Π + + . (20) 
We write the model in error correction form as: 
1 1 1 1 1
1 2
... :
....
t t t k t k t
k
X X X X ψ ε− − − − +∆ =Π +Γ∆ + +Γ ∆ + +
Π≡Ι−Π −Π − −Π . (21) 
The parameters (Γ1,…, Γk–1) define the short-run adjustment to changes in the process, 
whereas Π = αβ′ defines the short-run adjustment (α) and the long-run relations 
(β).Johansen and Juselius(1990,1992) shows that if Xt ~ I(1), Π (p × p matrix) has the 
reduced rank of r (< p) and can be represented as Π = αβ′. The parameterization in 
Π = αβ′ facilitates the investigation of the r linearly independent stationary relations 
between the levels of the variables, and the p–r linearly independent nonstationary 
relations. Thus, the representation of Π = αβ′ implies that the process ∆Xt is stationary, 
Xt–1 is nonstationary, but also that β′ Xt–1 is stationary. Thus, we can interpret the 
relation β′ Xt–1 as the stationary relations among nonstationary variables, i.e., as 
cointegrating relations. Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992) developed the likelihood 
procedure for estimating the parameters, and testing the order of cointegration rank and 
the various hypotheses on the restrictions of parameters. 
 
 
4. A Numerical Example 
4.1. Data 
 The monthly data for this study are taken from International Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics CD-ROM July 2006, and covers the period 1990:1–
2005:12. The prices P are line 63 (consumer price, 2000 = 100) or line 64 (wholesale 
price, 2000 = 100), and the nominal interest rate R is line 60P (lending rate %). An 
exception is the money supply, which is high-powered money compiled from the Bank 
of Japan (monetary base, seasonally adjusted, 100 million yen, average outstanding): 
HmoneyC (money/consumer price) and HmoneyW (money/wholesale price) are in 
logarithm form. The choice of variables followed previous papers including Phylaktis 
and Taylor (1993), Loviscek (1996) and Turner and Benavides (2001). Figure 5 shows 
real output y, line 66..czf (industrial production seasonally adjusted 2000 = 100), which 
shows that output seems to be fixed or stationary as assumed in Section 2. Finally, we 
also use deposit money (line 59MBFZF (M2+CDs, seasonally adjusted, 100 million 
yen)): DmoneyC (money/consumer price) and DmoneyW (money/wholesale price) are 
in logarithm form. All data are shown in Figure 5. 
 We now discuss the difference between the two kinds of money supply, deposit 
money and high-powered money. The former is related to consumer revenue U, the 
latter to seigniorage revenue S. When the money multiplier between deposit money and 
high-powered money is constant, the growth rate of both measures is equal to each other. 
Then, (14) can be theoretically expressed by the same growth rate θ. However, as 
shown in Figure 5, the growth rate of both measures is actually different. Moreover, the 
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money demand function of consumers is for deposit money. Therefore, we use deposit 
money and high-powered money as the money supply, as done by previous studies 
including Phylaktis and Taylor (1993), Honohan (1996), Loviscek (1996), Turner and 
Benavides (2001) and Tekin-Koru and Özmen (2003). 
[INSERT Figure 5] 
 
 
4.2. Estimation for the money demand function 
 We have to estimate the money demand function in (19) as a cointegrating term 
in (21). From the estimated parameter a in all pairs of cointegration relations, we seek 
an optimal money growth θ* = 1/a. The first step is to implement the augmented 
Dickey–Fuller (ADF) unit root test (using an autoregression (AR)) for R and the money 
supply, and the Johansen–Juselius cointegration test (using the error correction model 
(ECM) of (21)). A lag length must be chosen for the AR and the ECM following 
Phillips (1987) and Gonzalo (1994).2 For the AR, the optimal lag lengths together with 
the t-statistics of the ADF tests are reported in Table 1 and all are I(1).3 For the ECM of 
(21) in Table 2, we found that the two-order to six-order lags satisfied their criteria. The 
resulting cointegration rank between R and money is one at the 1% significance level, 
according to the λ-max test and the trace test in Table 3. We conclude that all pairs of 
time series variables have one cointegrating vector. We have estimated a money 
demand function in the cointegrating term, which is shown in Table 4. The optimal 
money growth rate θ* to maximize the seigniorage revenue S is 1/a = 3.08% for 
HmoneyW, 2.26% for HmoneyC, 11.09% for DmoneyW and 9.17% for DmoneyC. 
Thus, we have estimated two types of money demand function and optimal money 
growth, based on consumer and wholesale prices. The difference between deposit and 
high-powered money causes the difference between optimal money growth for 
seigniorage revenue. The computations have been performed with the computer 
package CATS in RATS by Hansen and Juselius (1995). 
[Insert Table 1, Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4] 
 
                                                 
2 Our procedure for choosing the optimal lag length was to test between a two- and an 18-order lag 
for the AR and between a two- and a six-order lag for the ECM, by using the minimum value of 
Schwarz’s Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). The residuals from the chosen AR or ECM were 
then checked for whiteness. Phillips (1987) and Gonzalo (1994) suggest the robustness of the 
Johansen–Juselius procedure to heterogeneity and nonnormality. Here, whiteness is checked only by 
Ljung–Box (LB) Q tests for absence of correlation for all 18 lags (for AR) and six lags (ECM) at the 
5% significance level. If the residuals in any equation proved to be nonwhite, we sequentially chose 
a higher lag structure until they were whitened. 
3 For some data based on visual inspection, we implement Perron’s (1989) unit root test with a break 
at 1995:7 for the lending rate R, and at 2003:12 for high-powered money m. The former is I(0), but 
the latter is I(1). Not all variables are necessarily I(0). Then, we assume all data are nonstationary 
even with a break. 
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4.3. Testing whether the observed data have occurred around point A, B or C 
 If the observed money growth rate θ, which is assumed to follow the normal 
distribution, occurs around the optimal rates θ* = 1/a, the observed data have occurred 
at point A and then the social welfare function displays seigniorage revenue loving. We 
test this hypothesis as follows. If the null hypothesis is H0: θ = θ* (in Table 5), the test 
statistics follows the t-distribution: ˆ( *) / ~ ( 1)At t nθ θ σ= − − , where n is the number of 
observations in the sample, Aθ  is the sample mean and σˆ  is the standard deviation of 
the sample. As shown in Figure 5, the seven high-powered money growth rate data 
overshoot 4% in magnitude. We omit these abnormal data prior to testing. The null 
hypothesis is rejected for each money demand function at the 5 or 10% significance 
level. When we estimate the money demand function by using HmoneyC, θ*=2.26% 
and we have to test this null hypothesis by using the average of the nominal high-
powered money growth rate Aθ =0.46, as shown in Table 5.  
 Similar logic is applied to whether the observed data occurs at point B. The null 
hypothesis is H0: R = 0 (in Table 6). This hypothesis is rejected at the 10% significance 
level. As a result, the social welfare function displays neither seigniorage revenue 
loving by suggesting point A nor seigniorage revenue neutrality by point B. That is, the 
social welfare function displays seigniorage revenue aversion by point C. This result 
shows that the Japanese government has a social welfare function W with a view of 
seigniorage revenue and consumer revenue that supports Mankiw (1987), where the 
government chooses the rates of tax and money growth to minimize the social cost of 
raising revenue from tax and seigniorage. 
[Insert Table 5 and Table 6] 
 
 
4.4. Degree of seigniorage revenue aversion 
 We find that the social welfare function displays seigniorage revenue aversion, 
supporting Bailey and Marty. The next logical step is to investigate the degree to which 
the money growth rate policy with seigniorage revenue aversion changed during the 
period 1990–2005 using the preference parameter α in the social welfare function. 
Considering (18), the parameter α is computed by using the average level of the 
observed (optimal) money growth θ, the average level of observed real interest rate r , 
and the estimated money demand parameter a. Here, the real interest rate r  can be 
computed as A Ar R θ= − , where RA is the average of the observed nominal interest rate, 
θA is the average of the observed (optimal) money growth rate and the preference 
parameter α is given in Table 4. Thus, as shown in Table 7, by using HmoneyW, the 
preference parameter α = 0.083 in the 1990s (1990:1–1999:12) decreases to 0.076 in the 
2000s (2000:1–2005:12) by 0.007: that is, a 10% decrease. By using the other money 
measures, we get the similar decrease in the preference parameter α. This shows that the 
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money growth rate policy in the 2000s has stronger seigniorage revenue aversion 
compared with the 1990s, as shown in Figure 6. 
[Insert Table 7 and Figure 6] 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 The purpose of this paper was to develop a seigniorage model that includes the 
contributions of Bailey and Marty, using a different framework to Mankiw (1987), to 
test whether their result is supported, and provide a numerical example to estimate the 
seigniorage model. The government decides the money growth rate to maximize the 
social welfare functions that display seigniorage revenue aversion, loving and neutrality. 
The numerical example using Japanese data showed the existence of seigniorage 
revenue aversion, supporting Bailey and Marty, and showed that the degree of 
seigniorage revenue aversion was stronger in the 2000s than the 1990s. However, this 
paper has only provided a theoretical model and an empirical application of the model. 
Further empirical studies are needed. 
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Appendix 1 
Derivation of difference equation and stability condition: Inserting (4) into (2), we 
obtain the difference equation: 
1 (1 ) ; 1
e e
t t
b
ab
π µ π µθ µ+ − + = − ≡ − . (A1) 
Because 1 + µ ≠ 1 because of (1) and (2), the solution is: 
1 (1 )(1 ) ( )
1 (1 )
t
e t
t c
µπ µ µθµ
− += + + −− + . (A2) 
 When |1 + µ | < 1, that is, –2 < µ < 0, the solution is stable. First, we analyze the 
interval of the parameters of a and b for µ < 0. Then, ab < 1. Second, for –2 < µ, we 
find (2 – b)/2b > a. We require a close interval of both: 
1 1
2
a
b
− > . (A3) 
This is the stability condition. However, we do not check empirically whether this 
condition holds for observed data. Our model is a difference equation and the stability 
condition is different from Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 188–198): ab < 1. The 
steady state is
0
lim ett π θ→ = . Furthermore, the dynamics of πt are, considering (4): 
1 1
e
t t
ab
ab ab
θπ π= −− − . (A4) 
Because the dynamics of πt do not include t except for πet, the stability condition is the 
same as (A3). In addition, the steady state of πt is obviously θ, considering (A4).  ■ 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Proof of Proposition 1: Taking the logarithm of W in (13) and considering (6) and 
(11): 
( )
ln ln( ) ln
( 1)exp( )ln exp( ) (1 ) ln
ln[( ) exp( ) ] (1 )( ln ) (1 )(ln( 1) ),
( ) , ( )
W S S U
Ay x xAy x rAy
a
xAy r x r a x x
a
xwhere x a r r and S rAy
a
α β
α θ α
α α α
θ θ
= + +
+ −⎛ ⎞= − + + − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= + − − + + − − + − + −
≡ + = − =
 (A5) 
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We maximize lnW in terms of x (i.e., maximize W in terms of θ). We take derivatives in 
terms of x: 
1exp( )( )ln 1(1 )( 1) 0
1( )exp( )
x arxd W a
xdx xr x r
a
α α
− +−
= + − − =+− − +
, (A6) 
2
2
ln 0d W
dx
< . (A7) 
Then, when W displays seigniorage revenue loving (α = 1), the optimal money growth 
rate θ is, considering (A2), 1 0x ar− + = , that is, θ = 1/a. Also, when W displays 
seigniorage revenue neutrality (α = 0), 1 1, . .,
1
i e r
x
θ= = −+ . When 0 < α < 1, what is 
the optimal money growth rate θ? In (A6) , we assume exp( ) 1x− ≈ . Because nominal 
interest rate R(= rθ +  ) and a are empirically zero point something shown in Table 4 
and then x= ( )a rθ + is very small. Therefore, (A6) can be rewritten as: 
2
1( )ln 1(1 )( 1) 0
1( )
(1 ) 0
x ar
d W a
xdx xr r
a
x xar ar
α α
α α
− +
= + − − =+− +
− − + =
. (A8) 
We can solve for x from (4), considering x > 0: 
2 21 [ 4 (1 ) ]
2
x ar a r arα= ± + +
. (A9) 
2 2
( ) 0,
1 [ 4 (1 ) ]
2
Dueto x a r
x ar a r ar
θ
α
= + >
= + + + . (A10) 
Because of (A10), 0 ( ) 0 0x ar and then considering x a r with aθ θ> > ≡ + > > . Then, 
the relationship between the optimal growth rate θ, the preference parameter α, the real 
interest rate r  and the parameter of money demand a is as follows: 
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
1( ) [ 4 (1 ) ], (2 ) 4 (1 ),
2
( )
1
a r ar a r ar a r a r ar
a r
ar
θ α θ α
θ θα
+ = + + + + = + +
+= +
 (A11) 
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where (A11) can be interpreted as a solution for the optimal money growth θ, given 
other parameters. Alternatively, it is interpreted that the unknown preference parameter 
α except for the government is expressed by the observed (optimal) money growth θ, 
the observed real interest rate r  and the estimated money demand parameter a.  ■ 
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Table 1. Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test for a unit root in the data 
 
 
Level τµ First difference τµ Level ττ First difference ττ 
R –2.33 (4) –3.14 (5) –1.47 (4) –4.93 (3) 
HmoneyW 0.77 (3) –6.01 (2) –2.61 (3) –6.19 (2) 
HmoneyC 1.58 (1) –6.29 (2) –2.22 (1) –6.72 (2) 
DmoneyW –0.84 (3) –8.07 (2) –0.29 (3) –8.07 (2) 
DmoneyC 1.50 (6) –5.28 (5) –3.25 (6) –5.78 (5) 
Notes: τµ and ττ are the test statistics allowing for constant mean and trend in mean, respectively. 
The reported numbers in the columns are the ADF statistics. Numbers in parenthesis after these 
statistics indicate the lag length used. The critical value for sample size 250 at the 0.05 
significance level is –2.88 for τµ and –3.43 for ττ. 
Table 2. Determination of lag lengths (multivariate LB test and SBIC test) 
 LB d.f. p-value Resulting lag 
R-HmoneyW 149.75 180 (0.95) 2 
R-HmoneyC 138.10 180 (0.99) 2 
R-DmoneyW 185.43 172 (0.23) 4 
R-DmoneyC 196.53 160 (0.03) 6 
Notes: R-HmoneyW is an error correction model consisting of interest rate R and HmoneyW. 
The other labeling is similar to this. The multivariate LB test statistic under the null hypothesis 
of the uncorrelatedness of residuals has an asymptotic χ2 distribution: see Hansen and Juselius 
(1995, p. 73). The values in parentheses denote p-values. 
Table 3. Tests of cointegration ranks 
Rank λ-Max  Trace Resulting ranks
Null hypothesis: H0 
Alternative: H1 
r = 0 
r = 1 
r = 1 
r = 2 
 r = 0 
r = 1 
r = 1 
r = 2 
 
R-HmoneyW 32.45 5.52  37.97 5.52 1 
R-HmoneyC 27.71 6.55  34.26 6.55 1 
R-DmoneyW 29.50 7.79  37.29 7.79 1 
R-DmoneyC 43.55 7.53  51.08 7.53 1 
Critical values, 5% 15.67 9.24  19.96 9.24  
Note: See the notes of Table 2. The r denotes the number of cointegrating vectors. The 5% 
critical values of the maximum eigenvalue (λ-max) and the trace statistics are taken from 
Osterwald-Lenum (1992, pp. 468). 
Table 4. Estimates of money demand function 
 ln(m) = C − aRt (19) An optimal money growth % (θ* = 1/a) 
for seigniorage revenue 
HmoneyW ln(m) = 10.784 − 0.325Rt 3.08% 
HmoneyC ln(m) = 11.395 − 0.442Rt 2.26% 
DmoneyW ln(m) = 11.463 − 0.084Rt 11.90% 
DmoneyC ln(m) = 11.615− 0.109Rt 9.17% 
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Table 5. Test for H0: θ = θ*: optimal money growth for seigniorage revenue 
 H0: θ = θ* Av. rates Aθ Std. of θ: σθ t-ratio: t = ( Aθ  –θ*)/σθ 
HmoneyW 3.08% 0.46 0.94 −2.79** 
HmoneyC 2.26% 0.46 0.94 −1.91* 
DmoneyW 11.90% 0.23 0.52 −22.44** 
HmoneyC 9.17% 0.23 0.52 –17.19** 
Notes: ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. Av. Aθ  and Std. σθ 
are the mean and the standard deviation, respectively. 
Table 6. Test for H0: R = R*: optimal money growth for consumer revenue 
 H0: R = R* Av. rates AR  Std. of R: σR t-ratio: t = ( AR  − R*)/σR 
R 0% 3.37 1.92 1.76* 
Notes: See notes of Table 5. The zero-truncated normal distribution for R is assumed. 
Table 7. Seigniorage revenue aversion α: 1990s and 2000s 
 a Aθ  A Ar R θ= −  α in (18) 
0.414 3.882 = 4.296 – 0.414 0.083 HmoneyW 1990s 
2000s 
0.325 
0.554 1.301 = 1.855 – 0.554 0.076 
0.414 3.882 = 4.296 – 0.414 0.128 HmoneyC 1990s 
2000s 
0.442 
0.554 1.301 = 1.855 – 0.554 0.127 
0.265 4.031 = 4.296 – 0.265 0.006 DmoneyW 1990s 
2000s 
0.084 
0.181 1.674 = 1.855 – 0.181 0.002 
0.265 4.031 = 4.296 – 0.265 0.010 DmoneyC 1990s 
2000s 
0.109 
 0.181 1.674 = 1.855 – 0.181 0.003 
Notes: See notes of Table 5. The 1990s and 2000s mean 1990:1–1999:12 and 2000:1–2005:12, 
respectively. 
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Figure 5. Data: 
High-powered real money, real M2 + CD and production index in logarithms 
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Note: moneys are measured in 100 millions at right left axis and production in no unit at 
right axis. 
Lending rate and growth rates of high-powered nominal money and nominal 
M2+CD (%) 
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